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Abstract
What is the role of firms and markets in mediating the division of labor? This
paper uses confidential microdata from the Census of Services to examine law
firms' boundaries. We find that firms’ field scope narrows as market size
increases and individuals specialize, indicating that firms’ boundaries reflect
organizational trade-offs. Moreover, we find that whether the division of labor is
mediated by firms differs systematically according to whether lawyers in a
particular field are mainly involved in structuring transactions or in dispute
resolution. We then analyze which types of specialists tend to work in the same
firm and which tend not to do so. Our evidence leads us to eliminate risk-sharing
as an important determinant of firms’ field boundaries, and narrows the set of
possible monitoring or knowledge sharing explanations. Our findings show how
the incentive trade-offs associated with exploiting increasing returns from
specialization help lead the structure of the industry to be fragmented, but highlyskewed.
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1. Introduction
As economists since Adam Smith have observed, individuals tend to become more
specialized as the size of the market increases. Once individuals specialize, economic institutions
become necessary to mediate relationships among them. When is the division of labor efficiently
mediated by firms? When is it efficiently mediated by markets? In addressing these questions,
we seek to illuminate the role firms and markets play in the organization of human capital. This
organizational issue has become increasingly salient as service sectors’ share of developed
economies has grown, because these sectors tend to be human capital-intensive.1
This paper investigates the determinants of law firms’ field boundaries. Our analysis
relies on law office-level data collected by the Bureau of the Census. A key question in the
survey form law offices receive asks how many lawyers in the office specialize in each of 13
areas of the law. This question provides evidence not only on law firms’ scope, but also on the
scope of individual lawyers’ expertise.

It allows us to examine patterns of individual

specialization, how specialists are organized into firms, and relationships between the two: how
does the division of labor across individuals affect the division of labor across firms? The data
provide us a rare opportunity to empirically investigate the organization of human capital, and
study the role of firms in facilitating specialization.
We employ two empirical approaches. The first approach investigates whether and how
firms’ boundaries are sensitive to the division of labor. We investigate whether lawyers fieldspecialize more as market size increases, and if so whether the share of lawyers working in fieldspecialized firms increases as well.

This provides evidence regarding whether law firms’

boundaries reflect only the distribution of individual clients’ demands, or reflect organizational
trade-offs: whether firms or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers.

If

organizational trade-offs are irrelevant, then firms' boundaries should be insensitive to the
division of labor; thus, the share of lawyers working in field-specialized firms should not
increase with market size, even if the share of lawyers that field-specialize does. Finding instead
that both the share of lawyers that field-specialize and the share of lawyers working in fieldspecialized firms increases with market size is consistent with the hypothesis that organizational
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trade-offs affect firms' boundaries. To ensure that our estimates capture the effects of market
size rather than differences in the composition of demand, this approach focuses only on small,
relatively isolated geographic markets.
The second approach examines which types of specialists tend to work in the same firm
and which tend not to do so. Unlike the first approach, it provides no evidence on how firms’
boundaries change with the division of labor, since individuals’ fields are held constant. But it
provides more detailed evidence with respect to law firms’ field composition. We use this
evidence to examine various hypotheses regarding what drives organizational trade-offs with
respect to firms’ boundaries: if law firms’ boundaries reflect Coasian organizational trade-offs,
what is the nature of such trade-offs? These hypotheses focus on the benefits and costs of
revenue-sharing arrangements. In particular, we consider the possibility that law firms’ field
boundaries reflect variation in the value of knowledge-sharing, risk-sharing, and monitoring
costs.
Results from the first approach indicate that both the share of lawyers that field-specialize
and the share of lawyers that work in field-specialized firms increase as market size increases.
This is evidence that firms’ boundaries sometimes narrow as market size increases and
individuals specialize. It is inconsistent with the proposition that firms’ boundaries reflect only
the distribution of clients’ demands, and consistent with the hypothesis that they are shaped by
organizational trade-offs: whether firms or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers.
We find that this relationship differs systematically across business-oriented fields according to
whether clients primarily demand expertise in the process of structuring transactions (“ex ante”
fields) or in the process of resolving disputes revolving around existing contractual relationships
(“ex post” fields). We do not find that firms’ boundaries narrow as individuals specialize in ex
ante fields: as lawyers specialize more in ex ante fields such as corporate law, there is little
evidence that relationships between them and lawyers in other fields are increasingly mediated
by markets rather than firms. In contrast, our evidence suggests that firms’ boundaries narrow as
lawyers specialize in ex post fields: fields such as insurance law tend only to be covered in the
same firm as other fields when insurance law and other fields are covered by the same lawyer.

1

In the U.S., the service sector's share of GDP (not including financial services) increased from 12% to 22%
between 1970 and 2000; this sector is currently about 40% larger than manufacturing. In contrast, manufacturing's
share fell from 24% to 16% during this time. See Economic Report of the President, February 2002, p. 336.
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Our evidence from individual-oriented fields is similar to that from the ex post business fields:
firms’ boundaries tend to narrow as lawyers specialize in fields such as criminal and domestic
law.2
Although our main results use data from only small, relatively isolated geographic
markets, we also show that our results persist when we use our full sample, which includes large
cities and suburbs in the analysis as well. Furthermore, we show that the patterns we uncover are
robust to controlling for differences in firm size.
Results from our second approach indicate several patterns in law firms’ field scope. We
find that lawyers in ex ante fields that serve business demands tend to work at the same firm as
lawyers in any of the ex ante business fields, and tend not to work at the same firm as lawyers in
either ex post business fields or fields that serve individual demands. For example, specialists in
corporate law tend to work at the same firm as specialists in real estate law, but not specialists in
insurance or criminal law. There are two exceptions to this general pattern. One is that patent
lawyers generally do not work at the same firm as specialists in other ex ante business fields.
The other is that probate lawyers, specialists who serve individual clients, tend to work at the
same firm as ex ante business specialists. For example, the scope of firms that have corporate or
real estate specialists generally tends not to include patent law but does tend to include probate
law, accounting for patent and probate lawyers’ share of the industry overall. Finally, we find
that lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with other lawyers in the same field than in
any other field.
This second set of results leads us to eliminate risk-sharing as an important determinant
of firms’ field boundaries, and narrows the set of possible monitoring or knowledge sharing
explanations.

Neither risk-sharing theories nor monitoring theories that emphasize fields’

cognitive closeness can explain why ex ante business fields tend to be found in the same firm.
These fields have positively correlated demands, but some of them draw from substantively
different bodies of the law. In contrast, monitoring theories in which shared client knowledge
lowers specialists’ costs of monitoring each other are consistent with these patterns, though they
require additional elements to explain the split between ex ante and ex post business fields. The
2

The result that law firms’ field boundaries tend to narrow as market size increases is related to Holmes’ (1999)
finding that manufacturing firms’ vertical boundaries tend to narrow as market size increases. Our paper differs
sharply from Holmes’ in many ways, particularly in its emphasis on the specialization of individuals, organizationtheoretic trade-offs, and its analysis of firms’ horizontal rather than vertical boundaries.
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same is true for theories where the benefits of organizing lawyers within a firm rest on
facilitating the sharing of client-specific knowledge.

Finally, theories in which organizing

lawyers within a firm facilitates referrals – the exchange of knowledge about economic
opportunities – can explain most of the patterns that we uncover with respect to firms’ field
scope. They may also be consistent with the fact that specialists in the same field tend to work
with each other, if lawyers “subspecialize” within fields or face time constraints, although this
fact may have other explanations as well.
Beyond deepening our knowledge of the role of firms in human capital intensive
contexts, our findings help illuminate several other issues, traditionally addressed by different
literatures. First, our findings on the horizontal scope of firms have bearing on the determination
of industry structure, a key concern of the industrial organization literature.3 Second, an
understanding of the effect of market size in the organization of work and the horizontal division
of labor is key to the study of the sources of agglomeration effects in cities and their role in
economic growth, a concern of the new urban economics literature.4 Third, our empirical
evidence illuminates the grouping of task types into jobs and of jobs into firms in law firms and,
as such, is of interest to the recent labor economics literature dealing with the problems of the
breadth of task assignment and of job design.5 Finally, understanding the sources of the tradeoffs involved in the coordination of specialists is relevant to the growth literature that, building
on Smith and Young (1928), investigates the determinants of specialization and the impact of
specialization on economic growth.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses Coasian and nonCoasian views of firms’ boundaries, relates them to our context, and describes our general
empirical approaches. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents results from our first
empirical approach, which investigates whether and how firms’ boundaries change with the
division of labor. Section 5 presents and discusses results from our second empirical approach,
which analyzes patterns in firms’ field composition. Section 6 concludes.

3

Sutton (1991, 1998).
See e.g. Glaeser et al (1992), Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, (2002).
5
See e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom, (1991), Olsen and Torsvik, (2000).
6
See e.g. Romer (1986, 1987).
4
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2. Understanding the Boundaries of the Law Firm
2.1. Law Firms and the Scope of Client Demands
A prevailing view of the scope of law firms is that it is client-centered. Support for this
view can be found in Heinz and Laumann’s (1982) study of the Chicago bar.7 This study, which
is perhaps the leading sociological analysis of the organization of professional services, stresses
how the type of client served shapes the organization of legal services. Heinz and Laumann
conclude that the bar is divided in two “hemispheres” that correspond to client type: the
corporate bar and the individual bar. Lawyers in these two hemispheres are so distinct in their
training, practice, and socio-economic characteristics so as to be considered within different
professions (1982:174). These authors conjecture that this division of the bar’s social structure is
reflected by a sharp distinction between law firms that serve corporate and individual clients;
those that serve corporate clients do not serve individual clients and vice-versa. Within each of
these “hemispheres,” and particularly in the corporate one, lawyers will tend to specialize, but
the firm will “feel the pressure to serve a broad range of the demands of the firm’s clients”
(1982:131).
An analogous, demand-centric view of firms’ scope exists within the industrial
organization literature as well. This view posits that scope economies can be demand-based,
derived from “one-stop-shopping” economies. A precise modern statement of this view holds
that in the presence of shopping costs8 multiproduct firms exist to “offer a variety of products at
a single destination” (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997:472).9 The scope of the firm is then shaped by
firms’ desire to capture externalities between product lines due to these shopping costs. As
applied to legal services, this view has implications that are similar to the sociological view
depicted above: law firms’ scope should reflect only the scope of clients’ needs, and not
problems associated with mediating relationships between lawyers.
An implication of these demand-centric views is that firm scope should not change as
market size increases if the composition of demand is held constant. If firms’ scope simply

7

The study is based on hour long interviews with 777 Chicago lawyers. Being the first in-depth study of a
profession, it is now considered a classic in sociology.
8
Shopping costs are the real or perceived costs of using additional suppliers (Klemperer (1992)).
9
Strategy researchers have also argued that offering demanders one-stop-shopping is a particular advantage of broad
scope (e.g. Porter (1985)).
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reflects the scope of individual clients’ demands, doubling market size by simply replicating the
demands of existing clients should not affect firms’ scope, since replicating demands does not
alter the scope-distribution of clients’ demands.
2.2. Organizational Trade-offs and Law Firm Boundaries
Since Coase (1937), economists have viewed firms and markets as alternative
institutional structures through which economic activity is coordinated.

Whether firms or

markets efficiently mediate the division of labor, and thus best promote specialization, depends
on which structure minimizes transaction costs. Modern theories of organization have since built
from Coase by proposing what differentiates transacting within versus between firms, then
analyzing the trade-offs associated with using firms and markets. While the details of these
theories differ, they share the Coasian view that firms’ boundaries reflect organizational tradeoffs; in this context, that they reflect whether relationships between lawyers are best mediated
within firms or by markets. What distinguishes this view from the demand-centric views above
is that it emphasizes that firms’ boundaries are determined not by demand patterns (e.g., whether
clients find expertise in different fields complementary), but by how relationships between
suppliers are best organized.
The Coasian logic suggests a natural way for investigating whether organizational tradeoffs affect firms’ boundaries: examine whether firms’ boundaries narrow as market size
increases and individuals become more specialized. We depict this in Figure 1. Suppose one
can partition knowledge into fields of expertise.

The dashed lines depict the scope of

individuals’ expertise, and the solid lines depict how individuals are grouped into firms. In the
Figure, one individual covers both field A and other fields in small markets but different
individuals cover field A and other fields in large markets. As market size increases, individuals
specialize in field A.
When a single individual covers both field A and other fields, the scope of his or her firm
includes field A and other fields. Organizational trade-offs, which appear only when different
individuals cover field A and other fields, do not affect whether the firm’s scope includes field A
and other fields. Firms’ scope tends to be broad because individuals cover multiple fields. But
once individuals specialize, firms’ scope depends not just on the range of individuals’ expertise,
but also on whether firms or markets mediate the division of labor efficiently. When firms do,
7

firms’ boundaries should not change as individuals specialize.

When markets do, firms’

boundaries should narrow. In the Figure, if markets efficiently mediate relationships between
individuals in field A and other fields, then firms’ scope should include field A and other fields
only when these fields are covered by the same individual.
One can therefore test whether organizational trade-offs affect firms’ boundaries by
examining whether firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of demand, holding
constant the distribution of demands. If organizational trade-offs associated with the division of
labor do not affect firms’ boundaries, then firms’ boundaries should not narrow as market size
increases and individuals specialize.

This is the case when, as depicted in the previous

subsection, firms’ boundaries merely mirror the distribution of demands of individual
demanders. Finding instead that firms’ boundaries narrow as individuals specialize is therefore
evidence that organizational trade-offs associated with the division of labor affect firms’
boundaries.10
2.3 Law Firms’ Boundaries: The Benefits and Costs of Ex Ante Revenue Sharing
Arrangements
Regardless of their legal form of organization, law firms in the U.S. are always structured
around “ex ante” revenue-sharing arrangements among the firm’s partners, i.e. arrangements that
are in place before individuals obtain information about specific economic opportunities, and
have the feature that all individuals receive some share of revenues from the services any of them
supply (although the share the involved individuals receive may be higher). Firms’ horizontal
scope reflects the fields that partners cover. From the perspective of the partnership, whether a
field is covered by the firm is equivalent to whether an individual with expertise in the field is
included in the revenue-sharing arrangement. Thus, when discussing the organizational tradeoffs with respect to law firms’ scope, we emphasize the benefits and costs associated with ex
ante revenue-sharing arrangements.11

10

The idea that firms’ boundaries may narrow as market size increases is not new to industrial organization. It is an
implication in Stigler (1951) and was studied recently by Holmes (1999). The Coasian logic discussed here is not
part of Stigler’s or Holmes’ analysis.
11
We focus on issues that bear on revenue sharing arrangements’ effect on firm scope. Revenue sharing
arrangements may have other roles as well, such as encouraging the hiring of high-ability individuals (Levin and
Tadelis (2002)). Similarly to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) and Holmstrom (1999), our account emphasizes how
firms can outperform markets by weakening individual incentives. Because the trade-offs we investigate are
different, so are our predicted relationships between specialization (job design) and optimal organizational form.
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The production of legal services also involves the use of other resources such as office
space, office equipment, libraries, or secretaries. Although scale economies exist with respect to
these resources, it is common, though perhaps not costless, for them to be shared across lawyers
in different firms when these resources would be otherwise underutilized.12 This feature of the
industry suggests that law firms’ boundaries are shaped primarily by contractual trade-offs rather
than technological trade-offs, consistent with the view taken by the economics of organization
literature.

Our analysis will thus focus on contractual issues rather than scale or scope

economies associated with inputs other than lawyers’ human capital. Nonetheless, we will show
that our main results are robust to controlling for firm size (i.e., the number of lawyers),
indicating that they are not driven by scale-related effects.
a. Knowledge Sharing
An important problem created by specialization is the need for individuals with different
expertise to share knowledge.

This knowledge could be about the existence of economic

opportunities or it could concern expertise relevant to addressing a client’s legal problem.
Consider first the problem of sharing knowledge about the existence of an opportunity
between lawyers with different expertise. A lawyer who knows that a particular client has a legal
problem may conclude that she herself has a comparative advantage in addressing this problem
or, alternatively, she may determine that some other lawyer is better qualified to deal with the
problem. In the latter case, she must refer it to another lawyer, potentially losing the rents that
could be derived from serving the client herself.
This problem was studied by Garicano and Santos (2003). They note that information
asymmetries favor those who have private information about opportunities, regardless of whether
firms or markets mediate relationships between individuals. Giving away this information is
equivalent to giving up rents. As a result, referrals take place under some incomplete
information, with an informational asymmetry that favors the referrer. In this context, ex ante

We do not address other incentive problems, such as those deriving from the risk of expropriation of specific
investments (Klein, et al. (1978)) or to the role of physical assets in providing incentives in the presence of
incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990)), which may be more important in other
environments.
12
Results from the Heinz and Nelson survey described below report that most sole practitioners share office space,
copying machines, libraries, and other fixed inputs with lawyers in other firms.
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revenue sharing arrangements facilitate the exchange of referrals.

When firms mediate

relationships between individuals, individuals share revenues regardless of who supplies the
service.

In contrast, when markets mediate such relationships, individuals with private

knowledge about an opportunity only share revenues with others if a referral actually takes
place.13 Individuals' incentives to hold on to problems that others have a comparative advantage
in solving are weaker when firms mediate relationships than markets, because they share
revenues even when no referral takes place.
Ex ante revenue sharing arrangements effectively tax individuals when they hold on to
opportunities themselves, thus weakening their incentives to hold on to opportunities for which
they are not best qualified to serve. Thus, one benefit of partnership-like arrangements – the
benefit of transacting “within a firm” – is that they improve the efficiency of the exchange of
referrals relative to alternative organizational structures.
A similar logic implies that ex ante revenue-sharing arrangements also facilitate the
exchange of substantive knowledge among specialists, such as legal expertise or knowledge
about clients. Again, incentive problems can arise from the exchange of knowledge because
when lawyers share knowledge with one another, they reduce their future value to clients relative
to those with whom they share it. Revenue sharing arrangements facilitate the exchange of
knowledge for two reasons. First, the receiver of knowledge shares with the transmitter a share
of his future revenues, so that the sender benefits in the future from the more extensive
knowledge of the receiver. Second, the sender shares with the receiver his present and future
revenues, thus diminishing the extent to which he appropriates returns from his own use of this
knowledge. Revenue sharing arrangements increase the extent to which the sender benefits
when others use his knowledge relative when he uses it himself.
It follows that lawyers should be more likely to work within the same versus different
firms, the more valuable knowledge sharing – referrals or collaboration -- is. Thus, lawyers in
fields across which knowledge-sharing is valuable should be more likely to be found within the
same firm than those in fields across which knowledge-sharing is less valuable.
b. Risk Sharing

13

Lawyers in different firms are generally allowed to compensate each other for referrals as long as the terms are
disclosed to clients. This is unlike the medical profession, in which compensation for referrals is (nominally)
prohibited.
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An alternative view of the benefits of revenue-sharing arrangements is that they facilitate
risk sharing among specialists. This is proposed by Gilson and Mnookin (1985). In this view,
revenue sharing arrangements insure lawyers against fluctuations in demand for their expertise.
It follows that such arrangements would be particularly valuable for lawyers in fields where
demands are negatively correlated, and least valuable for lawyers in fields where demands are
highly positively correlated.
c. Free Riding and Monitoring
The general drawback to revenue-sharing arrangements, the drawback to transacting
within firms in this context, is that free-rider problems emerge. Individuals do not appropriate
the full value of their efforts under such arrangements, and this weakens effort incentives.
(Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmstrom (1982)) Revenue-sharing arrangements could weaken
lawyers’ incentives to do high-quality work.

The agency costs associated with such

arrangements are one reason firms’ boundaries might narrow as market size increases and
individuals specialize.
Partnerships have other incentive instruments in addition to revenue-sharing
arrangements, such as bonuses. If used effectively, these instruments can mitigate free-rider
problems to some extent, and thus decrease the cost of transacting within firms. Using these
effectively, however, requires that lawyers be able to assess each others’ output. Because of this,
all of these incentive instruments tend to become less useful as specialization increases, since
agents’ expertise overlaps less. As lawyers become more specialized, the cost of transacting
within firms tends to increase. This would be particularly the case when different lawyers
specialize in fields where the fundamental legal doctrines have little overlap if this makes it
difficult for them to assess each others’ work. An implication is that, other things being equal,
lawyers in fields with strong cognitive connections should be more likely to work in the same
firm than those with weak connections, since the monitoring cost of transacting within firms is
lower.
2.4. Empirical Strategy and Implications
We provide empirical evidence with respect to whether these sources of variation affect
firms’ boundaries in two ways. One extends the exercise described above: we analyze how
firms’ boundaries narrow as market size increases and individuals become more specialized.
Specifically, we determine which fields tend to be covered in the same firm as other fields only
11

when they are covered by the same individual – that is, for which specialties the pattern looks
like the top rather than the bottom in Figure 1. Once individuals specialize in these fields, they
tend to work in field-specialized firms. Relationships between them and specialists in other
fields tend to be mediated by markets, not firms. The other approach simply assesses which
pairs of specialists tend to work in the same firm with one another versus not. Unlike the
approach described above, this holds individuals’ fields constant, and thus provides no evidence
on whether changes in the division of labor are associated with changes in firms’ boundaries.
But it provides additional evidence with respect to the scope of non-specialized firms. Returning
to Figure 1, while the first approach could detect whether specialists in field A work in the same
firm as specialists in other fields, it could not detect which other fields. Evidence on which
specialists work at the same firm as individuals in field A and which do not sheds some light on
whether firms’ scope corresponds to variation in the value of knowledge sharing, risk sharing,
and monitoring costs.
This evidence will narrow the set of possible organization-theoretic explanations of law
firms’ field boundaries. If firms’ boundaries are primarily driven by risk-sharing benefits, one
would expect fields that differ sharply in their client base to be more likely to be found within the
same firm than fields with similar client bases. In fact, we will find the opposite. We will also
be able to distinguish among various explanations in which firms’ scope is driven by knowledge
sharing or monitoring cost considerations. In particular, we will use evidence from Heinz, et al
(1998) on patterns of “co-practice” by individual lawyers – which combinations of fields lawyers
cover – as an indicator of fields’ cognitive connections. We then compare this evidence to ours.
We will find several cases in which specialists who work in fields that do not have strong
cognitive connections nevertheless are likely to work in the same firm, and interpret this as
evidence against monitoring-based theories that revolve around fields’ cognitive connections.
We will then discuss other monitoring-based and knowledge sharing explanations, and describe
the conditions under which they could explain the important patterns in our data. Distinguishing
definitively among these remaining explanations probably requires direct evidence on
monitoring, knowledge-sharing, and referral patterns across lawyers in different fields, evidence
that our data do not provide.
3. Data
12

The data are from the legal services portion of the 1992 Census of Services. Like in other
industries, the Census surveys individual establishments in this industry. Forms are sent to all
law offices that surpass a size threshold (approximately ten employees) or that are part of multiestablishment firms. In addition, forms are sent to a random sample of smaller offices, where the
sampling rate is set to obtain reliable MSA- and national-level estimates. In all, the Census
sends survey forms to law offices that account for approximately 80% of revenues in the
industry.

Details are in Bureau of the Census (1996).

The Census publishes MSA-level

estimates derived from this survey in Bureau of the Census (1996). In this paper, we use
establishment-level data, which are not publicly available.
Along with standard questions regarding revenues, payroll, and employment, the survey
asks law offices industry-specific questions that provide detailed information about the
distribution of lawyers across fields of the law. (See Appendix 1.) It asks respondents to
classify the lawyers that work in the office by their primary field and report how many are in
each category: how many lawyers at the establishment specialize in corporate law, for example.
When lawyers work in multiple fields, they are classified as “general practitioners.” The survey
thus provides unusually detailed information about organization and specialization at the
establishment level. We use data from 1992 because it is the most recent year for which the
Census asks about lawyers’ fields.
In all, the Census received responses to these organizational questions from about 28,000
law offices. We omit from our sample law offices with inconsistent responses for the total
number of lawyers; for example, those where the number of lawyers summed across fields does
not equal the number of partners plus the number of associates. Omitting these offices, our “full
sample” includes 26,151 law offices and 219,033 lawyers. These constitute about 17% of law
offices and 50% of privately-practicing lawyers in the United States in 1992.
Table 1 contains some summary statistics. The average law office has 3.56 lawyers, and
the average firm has 3.65 lawyers, a reminder that the average law firm in the U.S. is a very
small, single-establishment enterprise.

71% of the lawyers in our sample are reported to

specialize in one of the Census-defined fields. 37% of law offices and 28% of firms are
specialized, in the sense that all lawyers in the office or firm specialize in the same field. 28% of
lawyers work in multiestablishment firms, but only 5% of offices are part of multiestablishment
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firms. Although only 2% of the law firms in our sample have multiple locations, those that do
are much larger than most single establishment firms.
Table 2 provides a more detailed look at specialization patterns. We report these patterns
for each of the Census-defined fields. To facilitate analysis both here and below, we present
patterns for groups of fields that differ in the source and timing of demands. “Individual fields”
are those where all or nearly all demand comes from individuals; in our data, these include
criminal, domestic relations, negligence-plaintiff, and probate. We label the rest of the fields,
fields where a substantial part of demand comes from businesses, as “business fields.” Within
these groups, fields differ according to the timing of demands. We propose that demand for legal
services can arise either before a contractual arrangement is agreed upon, when lawyers may be
involved in drafting agreements and predicting the contingencies that agreements should address,
or after contractual terms are agreed upon and take force, when lawyers may be involved in
dispute resolution and litigation. We label these “ex ante” and “ex post” fields respectively.
Among the business fields, we classify insurance and negligence-defendant as ex post fields, and
the rest as ex ante fields. Expertise in insurance law is generally demanded to assess insurance
claims or provide defense for parties covered by insurance. (Abrams (2000)) Expertise in
negligence is demanded by defendants in tort-related matters. Among individual fields, we
classify probate as ex ante and the rest as ex post.14
Survey data confirms these cross-field differences in the source and timing of demands.
Table 3 reports results from an extensive interview-based survey (“Chicago Lawyers II”) of
Chicago lawyers completed in 1995 by Jack Heinz and Bob Nelson of the American Bar
Foundation.15 Questions in this survey ask privately-practicing lawyers what share of their time
they spend on business, non-business organizational (e.g., governmental), and individual clients,
and how many days per month they spend in state and Federal court. Days per month in court is
a good indicator for the degree to which lawyers provide “ex ante” or “ex post” services. We

14

We report these together in Table 2 because there is only one ex ante individual field.
These data were collected as a follow-up project to Heinz and Laumann (1982). Heinz and Nelson surveyed a
random sample of Chicago-based lawyers taken from the State of Illinois’ lawyer registration records. They
collected the data by conducting one-hour interviews with subjects at their offices. In all, 788 lawyers from this
random sample were interviewed, 526 of whom were in private practice. See Heinz, et. al. (1998) for more details.
We are extremely grateful to Jack Heinz and Bob Nelson for sharing their data.
15

14

report the average response for fields that closely match those defined in the Census data.16 The
table indicates a sharp break in the share of time lawyers in different fields spend on business
clients. Specialists in personal injury (on the plaintiff’s side of the bar), criminal, divorce, and
probate law spend almost all of their time on individual clients. The rest (except specialists in
municipal law, which predominantly have governmental clients) spend the majority of their time
on business clients. Likewise, personal injury, criminal, and divorce specialists spend more days
in court than lawyers in any of the other specialties, consistent with the idea that demands for
expertise in these fields tend to be more “ex post” than other fields. Although the number of
observations is very low, probate specialists appear to spend less time in court than other
specialists that serve individual clients, reflecting that the demand they face tends to be more for
“ex ante” services.
The first column of Table 2 reports the share of lawyers in each of the Census fields and
groups of fields. 27% of lawyers specialize in an "ex ante" business field; about a third of these
are corporate law specialists. 13% specialize in an "ex post" business field. 15% specialize in an
individual field; about half of these are classified as "negligence-plaintiff." The second and third
columns report the share of lawyers working in specialized offices and firms, by field. These
figures are very similar because individual offices within large multi-establishment firms are
generally not specialized by field: if a multi-establishment firm contains lawyers in different
specialties, its offices usually do as well. The final column reports the fraction of specialists that
work in specialized firms, by field. The notable pattern here is that, with the exception of patent
lawyers, ex ante business specialists are less prone to work in a specialized firm than ex post
business or individual specialists. Over a third of ex post specialists and nearly half of individual
specialists work at specialized firms, but less than 20% of ex ante specialists do. The lowest
fraction among the fields is for corporate law: only 5% of corporate law specialists work at firms
with only corporate law specialists.
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Even these do not always match perfectly. For example, the Chicago Lawyers II survey does not include a
separate category for “insurance law,” but the Census data does. Jack Heinz reported to us that he believes that most
of those reporting “insurance law” to the Census would classify themselves in the Chicago Lawyers II survey as
“personal injury-defendant.” Fifteen lawyers in the Chicago Lawyers II report themselves to be specialists in
“securities;” these lawyers would probably be classified as “corporate” in the Census data. These lawyers’
responses to the time allocation and days in court questions are very similar to the “general corporate” lawyers
reported in Table 1.
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Table 2 thus provides some initial evidence regarding firms’ scope. This evidence,
however, does not indicate that firms’ boundaries are sensitive to the division of labor: the fact
that ex post business and individual specialists are more likely to work in field specialized firms
than most ex ante business specialists may just reflect differences in the scope of clients’
demands. Furthermore, it provides no evidence on the scope of non-specialized firms: with
which other lawyers do lawyers in ex ante business specialties work? Sections 4 and 5, which
present the main empirical analysis in the paper, provide evidence on these fronts.
The Size and Distribution of Demand
In Section 4, we examine whether firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of
demand, holding constant the distribution of demands: the exercise that corresponds to Figure 1.
We merged our office-level Census data with data from 1992 County Business Patterns to obtain
controls for cross-sectional differences in the distribution of demand. County Business Patterns
(CBP) provides county-level information regarding the distribution of employment across
industries and the employment size distribution of establishments. We compute employment
shares for each of seven major (one-digit) industries (e.g., manufacturing) for each county;
although information is available for more detailed industry definitions for many counties, the
Census withholds more detailed data in many cases because of confidentiality-related
restrictions.17 We also compute the share of establishments within various employment size
categories in the county, and an estimate of employees per establishment by major sector. We
derive the latter by multiplying the size category shares by the midpoints of the employment size
categories.
The CBP data provide information about the distribution and size of local demand for
legal services. The employment shares characterize the local economy, and depict the extent to
which local demand for legal services comes from different classes of firms: manufacturing
versus financial services, for example. They also depict whether local demanders are small or
large firms overall and within sectors. For example, counties where the average establishment
size in financial services is large contain the country’s most important financial districts. If the
employment shares capture differences in the distribution of local demand well, one can think of
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We have run specifications with two-digit controls, using imputations for county-sectors for which the Census
does not report figures. None of the results differ from those reported below, that use one-digit controls.
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increases in total employment, conditional on these shares, as rotations in the demand curve for
legal services: proportionate increases in the various legal problems encountered by individuals
and businesses located in the county.18
An important concern in our empirical work is that variation in county-level employment,
conditional on our controls, captures differences in the size and not the distribution of demands
faced by lawyers based in the county. This condition seems a priori more plausible in some
contexts than others. It may be reasonable when comparing relatively small, isolated counties: to
a first approximation, the demand for legal services in Lubbock, TX, which is about twice as
large as Abilene, TX in terms of employment, may be simply two times that in Abilene. But
agglomeration economies may mean that the demand faced by lawyers in very large cities is not
just a “scaling up” of those faced by lawyers in very small cities; businesses may choose to
locate in very large cities precisely because they require special services that are only available
in such cities. Holding constant the employment shares described above, the demand faced by
lawyers in Houston may not be simply 18 times that in Lubbock. Furthermore, the distribution
of demands addressed by lawyers based in similarly-sized suburban and non-suburban counties
may differ, if suburban clients are served by lawyers who are based in nearby cities.
We address this concern by basing this empirical exercise on a part of our sample where
problems associated with agglomeration economies and market definition are relatively small:
counties that are either part of single-county Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as defined by
the United States Census or that are not part of MSAs.19 The Census combines counties into a
single MSA on the basis of their degree of economic and social integration. Restricting the
analysis to counties that fit the above criterion eliminates all counties that are economically
integrated with other, neighboring counties; it excludes all suburban counties and all but four of
the 50 largest MSAs in the United States.20 These four single-county MSAs – Honolulu, Las
Vegas, San Diego, and Phoenix – are much larger than the rest of the single-county MSAs; we
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Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) use rotations in the demand curve to identify relationships between competitive
conduct and entry in concentrated markets. The main issues in this paper – the specialization of individuals and
firms’ scope – play no role in their analysis. See also Campbell and Hopenhayn (2003).
19
The Census defines an MSA as “a core area containing a substantial population nucleus, together with adjacent
communities having a high degree of economic and social integration with that core.” To qualify as an MSA, an
area must have at least 50,000 population.
20
The Census combines two counties into the same MSA if at least 15% of inhabitants of one commute to the other
counties or at least 15% of employees in one commute from the other.
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exclude these as well.21 A full list of the MSAs in our “small market subsample” is in Appendix
2.

The counties in this subsample all relatively small and have a low level of economic

integration with other counties.

The largest of these is Tucson, AZ, which has 212,068

employees.
We examine the degree to which this sample restriction and our controls hold constant
the field distribution of demands by exploiting an additional variable in our data. The Census
asks offices to report the distribution of revenues by client type: what share of revenues come
from individual clients, business clients, and government clients? We regress the share that
comes from individual clients on county employment and our controls, weighting each office by
the number of lawyers that work there.

Finding that this fraction decreases with county

employment would imply that our controls do not completely soak up market size-related
differences in the distribution of demands: lawyers in larger markets handle disproportionately
business and government demands. In contrast, finding no relationship between the “individual
client share” and county employment would indicate that the distribution of revenues across
clients stay constant with market size, thus lending support to the assumption that, conditional on
our controls, the field distribution of demands more generally does not vary with county-level
employment.
Table 4 contains the results from this exercise. The first three columns use the small
market subsample. The first of these columns report coefficients from regressions that contain
only a set of market size dummies and no controls. The coefficients on these indicate that the
individual client share tends to fall with market size, even within the small market subsample.
The second column includes our set of controls. All of the coefficients are small and none are
statistically significantly different from zero. The fact that the coefficients decrease between the
second and first column provides evidence that the controls pick up differences in the
distribution of demands for legal services. The fact that the coefficients on the market size
dummies are no longer statistically significant implies that, conditional on these controls, there is
no evidence that the distribution of demands varies with county employment within this
21

There are two natural breaks in the employment size distribution of single-county MSAs. The four MSAs listed
here all have more than 335,000 employees. There are no such counties with between 215,000 and 335,000
employees. There are then six (Albuquerque, NM; El Paso, TX; Fresno, CA; Lancaster, PA; Madison, WI; and
Tucson, AZ) with between 170,000 and 215,000 employees, then none again with between 145,000 (Flint, MI) and
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subsample.

The third replaces the market size dummies with ln(county employment); the

coefficient on this variable is once again not statistically significantly different from zero.
Looking only at our small market subsample, we find no evidence of a relationship between the
individual client share and county employment once our controls are added, lending support to
the assumption that the size, but not the distribution, of demands varies with employment when
looking across these counties once we include these controls.
The other three columns repeat this exercise using the full sample. These results indicate
a relationship between the individual share and employment that persists even after including the
controls, particularly when comparing very large with smaller markets. This indicates that the
distribution of demands varies with employment when using the full sample. This evidence
shapes how we present and interpret the evidence from our first approach. While we will show
that the patterns that we uncover within the small market subsample also appear when using the
full sample, we will base inferences from our first approach on results from the small market
subsample.
Other Issues
Several notable empirical issues remain, even when restricting the analysis to the small
market subsample. One concerns market definition for lawyers working in multi-office firms. If
lawyers in multi-office firms serve clients based in all of the regions in which their firm is
located, using employment in the county in which the lawyer is based as a measure of market
size understates the actual market the lawyer potentially serves, and could bias our estimates of
relationships between specialization and market size. While this issue would appear to be
relatively minor with respect to our small market subsample – only 10% of lawyers in this
sample work at multi-office firms, and very few of the nation’s largest law firms have offices in
these counties – we investigated it nonetheless. Following the approach described in a working
paper version of this paper (Garicano and Hubbard (2003b)), we allowed market size to be a
function of employment in all of the counties a lawyer’s firm has an office rather than just the
county in which the office is located. There is no difference in our results when we do so. This
is not a surprise, since the working paper version of this paper had shown that accounting for this

170,000 employees. The results reported below include the six counties with between 170,000 and 215,000
employees; they are virtually the same when excluding these six counties.
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had little effect on the results when using our full sample – a sample that includes big-city law
firms with sizeable networks of offices.
A second issue is that individuals as well as businesses demand legal services, and
employment-based measures may not capture the size and distribution of individual demand
well. Better measures of individual demand would be population- rather than employmentbased, and demographic variables might capture certain demands well (for example, the demand
for probate work should be higher in regions with many elderly residents). We have run
specifications that use such controls. While some of the controls do help explain cross-market
differences in specialization patterns, none of our results of interest – which concern
relationships between specialization and market size – change when including these additional
controls.22
Finally, a third issue is whether our results persist when controlling for firm size.

While

this exercise is of empirical interest, it has an uneasy relationship with the organization-theoretic
view we describe above. In this view, lawyers, not firms, are the units of production. Firms are
viewed as one possible institution through which relationships among lawyers are governed.
Firm size (e.g., the number of lawyers in the firm) is an outcome of organizational trade-offs, and
all scale and scope economies are contractual in nature. In this light, firm size is not something
to control for; rather, since firms’ size in part reflects their scope, it is something that our
analysis illuminates.
This is not the only possible view of firms, however. In neoclassical theory, firms are the
unit of production, and some scale and scope economies (or diseconomies) are defined at the
firm level.
Suppose that firm-level scale and scope economies are intertwined, so that it is only
efficient for firms to be field-specialized if their scale is sufficiently high. For example, suppose
it is inefficient for a two-lawyer firm to be field-specialized but more efficient for a seven-lawyer
firm to be. Then if firms tend to be larger in larger markets, they would also be more fieldspecialized as well, but for reasons that need not have to do with Coasian organizational tradeoffs.

22

We do not report these results here because they are very similar to those reported below, and releasing results
from multiple, closely related specifications can raise disclosure issues for the Bureau of the Census.
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We investigate this by examining whether the relationships we uncover between market
size and the share of lawyers working in field-specialized firms persist when controlling for the
number of lawyers in the office. If law firms’ scope tends to narrow with market size only
because of firm size effects, there should be no relationship between the share of lawyers
working in field-specialized firms and market size once one controls for firm size. As we show
later, we do not find this to be the case: if anything, relationships between the share of lawyers
who work in field-specialized firms and market size become stronger once we control for the
number of lawyers in the firm.
4. Market Size, Specialization, and Organization
4.1

Empirical Framework

The first step in our empirical work examines relationships between market size and the
probability that lawyers specialize in one of the Census-defined fields. Our basic empirical
framework for examining relationships between market size and individual specialization is
simple. Let the probability that lawyer i in market j is a specialist of some sort be pi, where:
pi = f ( X j β1 )

Xj is a vector of observable characteristics of local market j and β1 is a parameter vector. The
coefficient on our proxy for local market size, county employment, will be of particular interest.
We interpret variation in this variable, conditional on our controls for the distribution of local
demand, as proportionate differences in the demand for the spectrum of services lawyers
provide.
Our data are at the level of the law office rather than the lawyer. We thus estimate β1
using the expression:
sk = f ( X j β1 )

where sk is the share of lawyers in law office k that are specialists of some sort, weighting each
observation by the number of lawyers working at the law office. To make interpreting the
coefficient estimates simple, we assume that f is linear, so:

sk = X j β1 + ε1k
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This produces a grouped data analog to the linear probability model; β1 can thus be interpreted as
a probability derivative. It captures reduced-form relationships between specialization shares
and market characteristics.
We estimate analogous specifications for particular fields and for groups of fields.
These, for example, relate market size and composition to the share of lawyers who specialize in
corporate law, or in any one of the ex ante business fields.
The second step in our empirical approach estimates specifications that relate the
probability that an individual works at a field-specialized law firm to market characteristics.23
Let pisf denote the probability that an individual is a specialist and works at a field-specialized
firm.24 We specify:

pi sf = f ( X j β 2 )
As before, because the unit of observation is the law office rather than individual, we estimate
specifications based on the equation:

sk sf = f ( X j β 2 ) = X j β 2 + ε 2 k
where sksf is the share of lawyers at office k who are in a specialized firm and we weight
observations by the number of lawyers. Note that sksf = 0 if lawyers at office k do not share the
same field as all other lawyers in their firm and sksf = 1 if they do; this is a discrete dependent
variable model. As above, we estimate analogous specifications for individual fields and groups
of fields.
Combined, β1 and β2 depict how much individual specialization increases with market
size, and whether increases in the division of labor across individuals take place within or
between law firms. They thus provide evidence regarding whether firms’ scope merely reflects
the scope of individual clients’ demands. If β1 > 0 and β2 = 0, this indicates that although
individuals specialize more as market size increases, the share of individuals working in fieldspecialized firms does not. This pattern corresponds to the upper arrow in Figure 1, in which
firms’ boundaries do not narrow as market size increases and individuals specialize. In contrast,
if β1 > 0 and β2 > 0, this indicates that both the share of individuals who specialize and the share
23

Very few lawyers work in field-specialized offices that are part of non-specialized multi-office firms. Thus, our
results and conclusions would be exactly the same if we analyzed relationships between market size and the
specialization of law offices rather than firms.
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of individuals who work in field-specialized firms increase with market size.

This would

indicate that sometimes the pattern corresponds to the lower arrow in Figure 1, in which firms’
boundaries narrow as market size increases and individuals specialize. When β1 > 0, β2/β1
reflects the degree to which increases in the division of labor are mediated by markets. Finding
such a pattern is therefore evidence against the hypothesis that law firms’ boundaries reflect only
the distribution of clients’ demands. It would indicate that firms’ boundaries sometimes change
with the division of labor, consistent with the view that organizational trade-offs – whether firms
or markets best mediate relationships between lawyers – influence law firms’ scope.25
4.2

Market Size and Lawyer Specialization

Table 5 contains results regarding individual specialization and market size using our
small market subsample. It presents estimates from eight regressions. In the first column, the
dependent variable is sk, the share of lawyers at law office k who are specialized in one of the
fields described above. In the top panel, there are no control variables. β1, the coefficient on

ln(county employment), is positive and significant: the share of lawyers who field-specialize is
greater in larger markets.

The point estimate of 0.137 indicates that doubling county

employment is associated with a 9.5 percentage point increase in the predicted share of
specialists. The bottom panel contains results when including our full set of controls. The
estimate of β1 hardly changes. While none of the coefficient estimates on the controls are
individually significantly different from zero, one can reject the null hypothesis that they are
jointly different from zero using an F-test with size 0.05.
The other three columns present results from analogous specifications, where the
dependent variable is the share of individuals that specialize in ex ante business fields, ex post
business fields, and individual fields, respectively. Looking at the bottom panel, each of the
estimates of β1 is positive and significant; lawyers specialize more in larger markets within each
24

Our results are unchanged if we define a specialized firm as one where most of the lawyers (rather than all) share
the same specialty, for example as one where 75% or 90% do.
25
The ratio β2/β1 is an instrumental variables estimate of the effect of lawyer specialization on law firm
specialization if county employment is a valid instrument for lawyer specialization. This can be seen by writing the
ratio as: β 2 / β1 = [∂sk / ∂ (ln( county employment ))] /[∂sk / ∂ (ln( county employment ))] = ∂sk / ∂sk . This identification
sf

sf

strategy requires that market size be related to firms' boundaries only through its effect on lawyers' specialization
decisions. In Garicano and Hubbard (2003a), we discuss why this assumption is plausible in human capital
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of these groups of fields. Note that these estimates differ from those in the upper panel; the
business field coefficients are lower and the individual field coefficient is greater. This is as
expected in light of Table 3, which showed that part of the simple relationship between the
individual client share and county employment reflected differences in the distribution of
demands that are picked up by the controls. Some of the coefficients on the controls are
statistically different from zero. As one would expect, the share of lawyers specializing in an ex
ante business fields is greater in counties with larger financial services sectors, and the share
specializing in individual segments is greater in counties with larger retail (and thus smaller
production-related) sectors.
Table 6 reports results from 13 additional regressions where the dependent variables are
the share of lawyers that specialize in each of the fields in our data. The estimates of β1 are
positive for each of the fields in our sample, and significantly greater than zero for six of the
fields. Assuming that changes in our market size measure alter the size but not the distribution
of demand for legal services, fields for which the coefficients are positive – corporate,
environmental, tax, insurance, criminal, and negligence-plaintiff (and perhaps also real estate and
probate, both of which are close to being statistically greater than zero) -- are those that tend to
be covered by "general practitioners" in very small markets but specialists in larger ones.
In sum, our evidence on lawyer specialization is that lawyers specialize more as market
size increases. These increases in specialization with market size reflect that small market
lawyers supply services that usually cross field boundaries, but this becomes less and less true as
market size increases. The next section examines whether firms’ field boundaries change as
well. In fields in which lawyer specialization increases with market size, this will indicate the
degree to which increases in the division of labor take place within or between firms, and thus
provide evidence whether organizational trade-offs affect firms’ boundaries.
4.3

Market Size and the Division of Labor Within and Between Firms

The first row of Table 7 contains results from regressions that are analogous to those in
the bottom panel of Table 5, but use sksf rather than sk as the dependent variable. These
regressions relate the share of lawyers working in field-specialized law firms to market size and
intensive contexts in light of recent organizational theory. We do not emphasize causal interpretations of β2/β1 in
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composition. These relationships are of particular interest for fields in which individual lawyers
specialize more with market size. Finding that lawyers become more specialized and work more
in field-specialized firms as market size increases indicates circumstances where organizational
trade-offs influence firms’ boundaries; in these cases, the division of labor tends to be mediated
between rather than within firms.
In the first column, the dependent variable is the share of lawyers who work in a fieldspecialized law firm. β2, the coefficient on ln(county employment), is positive and significant: as
market size increases, a larger share of lawyers works in field-specialized firms. The point
estimate is 0.066, indicating that doubling market size is associated with a 4.6 percentage point
increase in the share of lawyers working at specialized firms. This is about one-fourth of the
sample mean of 16.2%. The bottom of the table contains the estimates of β1 from the bottom
panel of Table 5, which track relationships between individual lawyer specialization and market
size. The ratio of the point estimates, β2/β1, equals 0.49, indicating that about half of the overall
increase in the division of labor is happening between rather than within firms. This indicates
that in some cases, firms’ field scope narrows as market size increases, suggesting that firms’
boundaries do not merely reflect the distribution of demands. This evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that organizational trade-offs, which appear only when fields are covered by different
individuals, influence firms’ boundaries.
The other three columns break things down by classes of fields as before. In the second
column of the top row, the dependent variable is the share of lawyers that work at an office
where all lawyers specialize in a single ex ante business field. The coefficient on ln(county
employment) is very small and not statistically significantly different from zero.

Table 5

indicated that as market size increases, lawyers specialize more in these fields; this result
provides no evidence that they are more likely to work in field-specialized firms. The ratio β2/β1
is approximately 0.14, indicating that practically all of the increase in the division of labor is
occurring within rather than between firms. In contrast, in the next column of the top row, the
dependent variable is the share of lawyers that work at an office where all lawyers specialize in a
single ex post business field. Here, the coefficient on market size is positive and significant.
From before, as market size increases, more lawyers become insurance and negligence-defendant
specialists. Here, we see that a substantial fraction of these specialists work in specialized law
this paper.
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firms. The ratio β2/β1 provides an estimate of this fraction: 41%. Like the ex ante business
fields, the division of labor increases with market size; unlike the ex ante business fields, a
significant fraction of it happens between rather than within firms.
This result indicates that ex post business fields tend only to be covered in the same firm
as other fields when they are covered by the same person, but ex ante business fields tend to be
covered in the same firm as other fields even when they are covered by different individuals.
Assuming that variation in our market size proxy captures differences in the size but not the
distribution of demand, demand for services that involve each of these fields of the law exists in
smaller markets, but the individuals supplying these services tend not to be specialized. For
example, lawyers who advise clients on insurance law issues might also advise clients on
corporate and tax law issues. When individual lawyers have multiple specialties, so do firms.
As market size increases, lawyers specialize more: different lawyers begin to advise clients on
different areas of the law. As lawyers specialize, some specialties remain within the firm and
some are spun off: the scope of the firm continues to include corporate and tax law, but it often
no longer includes insurance law.
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the general patterns for ex ante and ex post business fields,
respectively. The top line in each represents the share of lawyers in a specialized field, and the
bottom line represents the share of lawyers working at a field specialized law firm. For the ex
ante fields, the distance between the lines increases with market size; an increasing share of
lawyers work as specialists but in non-specialized firms. The bottom line is flat. For the ex post
fields, the distance between the lines increases somewhat but the bottom line is upward sloping.
More lawyers specialize in these fields as market size increases, and an increasing share of
lawyers work in specialized firms.
Finally, the last column reports results for the same exercise for the individual fields. In
the top panel, the coefficient on ln(county employment) is positive and significant. The ratio

β2/β1 equals 0.66. Lawyers specialize more in individual fields as market size increases, and
when they do so, they work in field-specialized firms. Firms’ boundaries thus tend to narrow as
market size increases.
Table 8 provides a more detailed view. The dependent variables in these regressions,
analogous to the top panel of Table 7, are the share of lawyers working at firms that specialize in
the different fields. The contrast in Table 7 between ex ante business and other fields holds in
26

this table as well. None of the coefficient estimates in the first row show statistically significant
relationships between market size and the fraction of lawyers working in field-specialized firms.
In contrast, several of the coefficients in the other rows are positive and significant, and all of the
point estimates are larger than any of those in the first row.

Full Sample Estimates and Firm Size Controls
Table 9 reports three sets of results. The top panel is the same as Table 6. The middle
panel uses the full sample rather than the small market subsample. Although the magnitudes of
the estimates are lower, especially in the last column, the general pattern of the results is similar
when including large cities and suburban counties in the analysis. The ratio β2/β1 in the first
column is about one-half, and as before, this ratio is higher for the individual than business
fields, and for the ex post than the ex ante fields. We have also run these specifications using

only large markets (those with more than 200,000 employment; the results are reported in
Garicano and Hubbard (2003b)), and the estimates are very similar to those in the middle panel
here. While the conceptual exercise is far cleaner when using the small market sample rather
than the full sample, the results are quite similar across these samples.
Returning to the small market subsample, the bottom panel reports estimates of β1 and β2
when we including a set of dummy variables that depict the number of lawyers in the office
along with our other controls.26 Once again, the estimates of β2 are positive and significant in
the first, third, and fourth columns. To the extent that the point estimates of β2 change when
including the number of lawyers dummies, they increase. There is thus no evidence that the
estimates in the top panel, which indicate that firms’ field scope tends to narrow as market size
increases, reflect just “firm size effects.”27

Summing Up
We conclude that firms’ boundaries change with increases in the size of demand, holding
constant the distribution of demands. In particular, as lawyers specialize in ex post business
fields or individual fields, these fields tend to be spun-off into separate firms. This result is
26

We include 11 dummies that capture whether the law office has 1-12 lawyers, plus a dummy for whether it has
more than 12 lawyers. Less than 5% of the offices in the small market subsample have more than 12 lawyers.
27
Note that the ratio β2/β1 in this panel is not interpretable in the same way as when the model is estimated without
the size dummies. The conceptual experiment that supports the interpretation that this ratio is the fraction of the
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inconsistent with the hypothesis that organizational trade-offs associated with the division of
labor do not affect firms’ boundaries, since under this hypothesis, firms’ boundaries simply
reflect the distribution of individual demands and should not narrow as market size increases and
individuals specialize.
Which specific organizational trade-offs matter in determining law firms’ boundaries?
The fields that are spun off (individual fields and ex post business fields) have a common
characteristic: they are mostly concerned with dispute resolution, and much of the work
undertaken by these lawyers has to do with addressing legal problems that clients themselves can
identify: at the individual level, a divorce, a burglary or a lawsuit; at the business level, a lawsuit
or a complex insurance claim. On the other hand, fields that are not spun off tend to be those
where much of lawyers’ work has to do with structuring transactions. What does this mean?
And is there evidence that lawyers in these transactional fields tend to work in the same firm
with each other, and not with lawyers in other fields? The following section deepens the previous
analysis by providing evidence on which types of specialists tend to work at the same firm with
one another and which do not.28 We then interpret these patterns in light of the knowledgesharing, risk-sharing, and monitoring cost hypotheses discussed above.
5. The Field Composition of Law Firms
We develop a statistic that indicates the degree to which lawyers in one field work in the
same firm with lawyers in other fields, relative to a benchmark in which the field-shares of
lawyers in each firm is the same as the field-shares of lawyers in the economy.29 Let Ni be the
number of lawyers in firm i and nij be the number of those lawyers who specialize in field j. We
start by computing the share of field a lawyers in the average field b lawyer’s firm. Define this
share as sab:

time the division of labor is mediated by markets (as depicted in Figure 1 and Section 4.1) does not hold firm size
constant.
28
See also Phillips and Zuckerman (2001), who analyze the determinants of whether Silicon Valley law firms’
scope includes family law.
29
Previous versions of this paper (Garicano and Hubbard, 2003b), reported versions of the Ellison-Glaeser statistic
(Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), which uses random allocation rather than a uniform distribution as a benchmark. The
results are very similar. We report the uniform-benchmarked statistics described here because the magnitudes are
more readily interpretable.
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s ab = ∑

nib nia
∑ nib N i

where all the sums are taken over i. sab is a weighted average of the share of lawyers in field a,
where the average is taken across all firms in the economy and the weight for each firm i is the
share of b lawyers in the economy who work in firm i. We then normalize sab by the share of
lawyers in field a in the economy. Thus for any pair of fields a and b, this statistic is:

Γ ab =

s ab 1
=
sa sa

nib nia
∑ nb N
∑i i

Γab is the share of field a lawyers in the average field b lawyer’s firm, normalized by sa, the share
of lawyers in field a in the economy. It is straightforward to show that this statistic is symmetric:
i.e. Γab = Γba.
This statistic is easy to interpret. Γab = 1 if the share of field a lawyers in each firm
where field b lawyers work is equal to the share of field a lawyers in the economy. If Γab > 1,
this indicates that most field b lawyers work in firms with high shares of field a lawyers, relative
to the share of field a lawyers in the economy. Γab = 1.30 indicates the share of field a lawyers in
the firm where the average field b lawyer works is 30% higher than in the population as a whole.
Γab = 0.70 indicates that it is 30% lower.
Table 10 presents our results from this approach. We first note four important patterns.
First, the general pattern with the off-diagonal terms is that ex ante business specialists tend to
work at the same firm as one another, but most other pairs of specialists tend not to do so. Most
of the statistics in the upper left of the figure are greater than one; most in the rest of the figure
are less than one. The second and third patterns are the exceptions to this rule. The second is
that specialists in patent law, classified as an ex ante business field, tend not to work at the same
firm with specialists in other ex ante business fields (or any other field, for that matter). Unlike
other ex ante business specialists, patent lawyers tend to work in firms that are field-specialized.
The third is that specialists in probate law, an individual field, tend to work in the same firm with
ex ante business specialists. In fact, they are more likely to work at the same firm as banking,
corporate, environmental, and other ex ante business specialists than other types of individual
specialists. This is the exception to the general rule that specialists in business and individualoriented fields tend not to work at the same firm with each other. Last, the diagonal terms are
systematically greater than the off-diagonal terms. Some of this is artificial, since part of the
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high value of the diagonal reflects that specialists always work at firms where the share of their
own field is positive – their firm reflects themselves. At the bottom of the table we report
statistics for the diagonal terms that do not include this effect; these statistics remain greater than
any of the associated off-diagonal terms. Lawyers are more likely to work at the same firm with
lawyers in their own field than with lawyers in any other field. This reflects groups of partners
and associates in the same field working at the same firm.30
Broadly, these patterns provide no support for the hypothesis that law firms’ field
boundaries strongly reflect the risk-sharing benefits of revenue-sharing arrangements. Lawyers
in the same field or fields where demands are closely related tend to work at the same firm more
than lawyers in fields where demands are less closely related. Demand for the services supplied
by banking, corporate, real estate, and other ex ante business fields is likely positively correlated,
but specialists in these fields tend to work at the same firm with each other.
It is also difficult to explain these patterns with a monitoring-based theory that
emphasizes cognitive connections across fields. Although some of the ex ante business fields
have strong cognitive connections with each other, others do not. For example, corporate law
has some doctrinal overlap with banking law, but is largely distinct from other ex ante business
fields such as environmental law and real estate law. It is unlikely that the legal expertise of
corporate law specialists provides them a comparative advantage in monitoring lawyers in these
other fields.
Some empirical justification for these claims about cognitive relationships across fields is
evident in Heinz, et al (1998), who analyze the “patterns of co-practice” of the 788 randomlyselected Chicago-based lawyers in the “Chicago Lawyers II” database described above. These
data contain detailed information on how individual lawyers, including non-specialists, allocate
their time among fields. One would expect non-specialists’ field coverage to reflect some
combination of the scope of clients’ demands and scope economies in learning. The latter would
be derived from fields’ cognitive closeness: if banking and corporate law are cognitively close,
one would expect lawyers who spend some of their time addressing problems in banking law to
also spend some of their time addressing problems in corporate law. Conversely, observing that
few or no lawyers spend time in both corporate and environmental law is consistent with the
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Garicano and Hubbard (2003c) study partner-associate ratios and how they vary with returns to specialization.
This paper investigates more thoroughly the organization of specialists in the same field.
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hypothesis that these fields are not close in this way. Heinz and Laumann (1998) find that,
indeed, an extremely small share of lawyers that spend at least 5% of their time in corporate law
also spend at least 5% of their time in environmental law, and vice-versa. This is not because all
lawyers who do work in these fields are specialists: these authors’ results indicate that it is not
unusual for lawyers to spend at least 5% of their time in both corporate law and other fields such
as banking or tax law, and it is not unusual for lawyers to spend at least 5% of their time in
environmental law and other fields such as negligence-defense. Similar results hold when
examining connections between corporate and real estate law, and between corporate and
government-related subfields such as utilities law and municipal law. These patterns of copractice provide no support for the hypothesis that corporate law has a close cognitive
connection to environmental, real estate, or government law. We thus conclude that it is unlikely
that the patterns in Table 10 reflect that monitoring costs are low among specialists in the ex ante
business fields because of their fields’ cognitive closeness.31
In contrast, our evidence does not allow us to reject a different hypothesis about the
source of monitoring-related scope economies, namely that they have to do with client- rather
than field-specific factors. For example, client knowledge required to structure a transaction
(such as location of the firm being bought, type of firm, history of the firm) is used by all the
lawyers involved in the transaction and this shared knowledge base may allow cheaper
monitoring across those lawyers. Free-rider problems associated with organizing these fields
within the same firm may be lower as a consequence. Such a theory would leave open the issue
of why the monitoring-related benefits of shared client knowledge do not extend to the ex post
business fields as well. It is possible that such benefits only apply when lawyers are working
with clients at the same time.
Finally, our data are consistent with certain hypotheses regarding firms’ role with respect
to knowledge-sharing.

First, fields may be grouped in order to facilitate the exchange of

substantive knowledge – legal expertise or facts about the client -- between lawyers in different
fields. This can easily explain some patterns in our data: for example, why ex ante business
specialists (except patent lawyers) tend to work in the same firm with each other. This version of

31

Heinz, et al’s (1998) results are similar to those in Heinz and Laumann (1982), which analyzes data from 1975.
One of these authors’ main inferences is the point we make here: the organization of legal services does not simply
reflect cognitive relationships between fields.
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the knowledge-sharing theory has a more difficult time explaining why these business specialists
tend not to work at the same firm as specialists in negligence-defense or insurance law, unless
substantive or client knowledge that is useful in organizing transactions is not useful in litigation
and vice-versa.
Second, fields may be grouped to facilitate the exchange of knowledge about
opportunities – referrals -- across field-specialized lawyers. The patterns in our data could
reflect differences in the value of cross-field referrals. This version of the knowledge-sharing
hypothesis can more easily explain the split between ex ante and ex post fields. One would
expect knowledge-sharing about opportunities to be more valuable across ex ante fields than ex
post fields if clients’ ability to assess the scope of their legal problem – their ability to self-refer - differs with the timing of demand. Clients demand ex ante services in anticipation of potential
future disputes among parties or conflicts with the law; these problems often potentially can
involve many different areas of the law. (Does this deal have important tax implications or
create regulatory problems?) Legal expertise is valuable for determining which of these areas
are important. In contrast, it tends to be less difficult for clients demanding ex post services to
determine the range of relevant legal expertise. The interaction between a client's situation and
the law is often clear, even to non-experts. For example, expertise in insurance law is valuable
for a company with a complicated insurance claim; expertise in torts is valuable to a company
being sued for negligence. While legal expertise is generally valuable for such clients, referrals
across specialists in different areas of the law tend not to be because the scope of most clients'
legal problems is well-defined at this point in contractual time. If this is true, this could explain
why lawyers in ex ante fields tend to work in the same firm with each other, while lawyers in ex
post fields tend to work in field-specialized firms. It could also explain the exceptions to the
general empirical pattern. Patent law is fairly distinct from other areas of the law, and is
probably an exception to the rule that clients have difficulty judging the scope of services they
need for ex ante problems. Referrals between ex ante business specialists and probate lawyers
may be valuable, as when the senior management of corporate clients needs help arranging wills
and estates.
In contrast, this version of the knowledge sharing theory does not explain why lawyers in
the same field tend to work with each other in the same firm (the diagonal pattern in Table 10), if
it is the case that such lawyers’ expertise is the same and lawyers face no time constraints. In
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such situations, referrals across lawyers would be not valuable and one would not expect to
observe that, for example, corporate law specialists work in the same firm as other corporate law
specialists. We make the following observations. First, it is highly likely that there are withinfield differences in lawyers’ expertise that are not picked up in our data: for example, corporate
lawyers vary in their ability and sometimes sub-specialize within corporate law (e.g., in
securities law). Second, lawyers do face time constraints, and this may make referrals valuable
even among lawyers with the same expertise. Either of these conditions could reconcile this fact
with the “referrals” version of the knowledge sharing theory, although this fact could have other
explanations as well.
In sum, while this evidence does not allow us to establish a particular organizationtheoretic explanation for law firms’ field boundaries, it allows us to eliminate risk-sharing as an
important element and puts some structure on the type of monitoring or knowledge sharing
hypotheses that are compatible with our data. Risk-sharing theories or monitoring theories that
emphasize fields’ cognitive closeness cannot explain major patterns in our data. Monitoring
theories or knowledge-sharing theories that rest on the value of shared client knowledge can
explain many patterns in our data, but require additional (but perhaps reasonable) elements to
explain the split between the ex ante and ex post business fields. As established earlier, firms’
boundaries do not simply reflect the scope of clients’ demands; these additional elements must
therefore explain why shared client knowledge is valuable among some, but not all, a client’s
lawyers. Finally, theories in which firms facilitate the exchange of economic opportunities can
easily explain most of the patterns we uncover with respect to firms’ field scope, including the
division between ex ante and ex post fields, but require additional (but once again perhaps
reasonable) assumptions to explain why a specialist in one field is more likely to work with a
specialist in the same field than with one in any other field.
6. Conclusion

Economists have long recognized that economic activity is organized, in part, to exploit
increasing returns.

For example, a large literature in industrial organization analyzes

relationships between industry structure and scale economies; these economies are generally
depicted as arising from fixed costs associated with physical capital. But physical capital is not
the only source of increasing returns that can affect how production is organized into firms.
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Rosen (1983) emphasizes that there are increasing returns to human capital, as the cost of
learning a skill is independent of its subsequent utilization rate. It follows that the organization
of industries where production is knowledge-intensive should reflect problems associated with
exploiting returns to human capital specialization. That is, it should reflect trade-offs that have
traditionally been examined in the economics of organizations literature starting with Coase
(1937) rather than the industry structure literature.
This paper provides new empirical evidence on how one human-capital-intensive
industry, legal services, is organized. Our evidence indicates that organizational trade-offs affect
firms’ field scope: firms’ field scope tends to narrow as market size increases and lawyers
specialize. Firms’ boundaries reflect not just the scope of clients’ demands, but also how
relationships between lawyers are optimally organized. Moreover, this pattern varies across
fields. As market size increases, the division of labor between lawyers in fields involved in
structuring transactions tends be mediated within firms. In this segment of the market, firms’
scope does not narrow as market size increases. In contrast, the division of labor between
lawyers in fields involved in dispute resolution and litigation and lawyers in other fields tends to
be mediated by markets. Firms’ boundaries narrow with market size as individuals become more
specialized; in larger markets, these services tend to be supplied by lawyers in field-specialized
firms. These and other patterns are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms’ field boundaries
reflect variation in the benefits of risk-sharing or the cognitive relationships between fields.
They are consistent with theories that emphasize firms’ role in facilitating the exchange of
knowledge, and some variants of theories in which shared client knowledge lowers specialists’
costs of monitoring each other. Distinguishing further among these theories probably will
require direct evidence on referral and monitoring patterns, evidence that our data cannot
provide.
These findings have implications for the industry structure. Two notable features of the
legal services industry in the United States are that the average firm size is small, and that the
size distribution of firms is highly skewed: even within large markets, the largest firms have
many times more lawyers than the median firm. Our findings suggest that the incentive tradeoffs associated with exploiting increasing returns from specialization in this industry differ
across fields, and help lead the structure of the industry to be fragmented, but highly-skewed.
The fragmentation results from the fact that, for the reasons we discuss above, the division of
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labor between lawyers in different fields is usually best mediated by markets. The skewness in
part reflects that relationships between lawyers in ex ante fields such as corporate, tax, and real
estate law are often best mediated by firms. Future research is needed to investigate how the
organizational trade-offs that shape the structure of the legal services industry – including those
associated with knowledge sharing and monitoring – influence the structure of other humancapital-intensive industries.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics -- Lawyers, Law Offices, and Law Firms

N

Lawyers

Offices

Firms

219033

26151

23465

3.56

3.65

0.37
0.05

0.28
0.02

Average Number of Lawyers
Share Specialized
Share Multiestablishment

0.71
0.28

Averages and shares computed using sampling weights supplied by the Bureau of the Census.
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Table 2
Shares of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Offices, and Firms

Ex Ante Business Field
Banking
Corporate
Environmental
Governmental
Patent
Real Estate
Tax
Ex Post Business Field
Insurance
Negligence-Defendant

Share of Lawyers
In Specialized Fields

Share of Lawyers
In Specialized Offices

Share of Lawyers
In Specialized Firms

Fraction of Specialists
In Specialized Firms

0.270

0.047

0.044

17.4%

0.047
0.083
0.016
0.015
0.020
0.062
0.028

0.006
0.004
0.001
0.002
0.014
0.014
0.005

0.005
0.004
0.001
0.002
0.014
0.013
0.005

12.9%
4.8%
6.2%
13.7%
70.4%
22.7%
17.9%

0.128

0.044

0.044

34.5%

0.061
0.066

0.025
0.018

0.023
0.018

40.8%
27.2%

Other Specialized Field

0.155

Individual Field

0.158

0.071

0.071

44.9%

0.024
0.026
0.074
0.035

0.012
0.009
0.042
0.008

0.012
0.009
0.041
0.008

49.7%
34.8%
57.1%
23.1%

Criminal
Domestic Relations
Negligence-Plaintiff
Probate
General Practice

0.289

All shares computed using Census-provided sampling weights.
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Table 3
Share of Time on Business Clients, Days per Month in State or Federal Court
Selected Fields

Specialty

Commercial Law: Banking
General Corporate
Municipal Law
Environmental Law
Real Estate
Tax
Patents, Trademarks or Copyrights
Personal Injury -- Defendant
Personal Injury -- Plaintiff
Criminal
Divorce (including family, adoption, etc.)
Probate (wills and trusts)

Share of Time
Business Clients
(percent)

Days per Month
In State or Federal
Court

N

91.3
86.1
35.6
82.3
69.9
64.7
89.8
88.3
7.6
10.0
8.0
3.8

6.4
1.8
0.5
2.8
2.9
1.3
2.0
11.6
13.9
16.7
16.7
6.0

8
12
6
12
43
32
25
20
16
9
7
4

Source: Chicago Lawyers II survey.
Fields are as listed on Chicago Lawyers II survey forms.
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Table 4
Share of Revenues from Individual Clients and Market Size
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Law Office's Revenues That Come From Clients Who Are Individuals.
Small Market Subsample

Full Sample

Employment 20K-100K

-9.77
(1.88)

-2.59
(2.02)

-8.75
(1.47)

1.04
(2.03)

Employment 100K-200K

-13.14
(2.27)

-1.05
(3.31)

-20.27
(2.49)

-4.00
(2.90)

Employment 200K-400K

-17.99
(9.33)

0.45
(8.27)

-27.50
(2.23)

-5.97
(3.37)

Employment 400K-1M

-36.19
(3.09)

-11.85
(4.11)

Employment > 1M

-43.74
(2.76)

-19.11
(4.31)

ln(employment)

-4.42
(0.82)

-1.57
(1.07)

C

Includes Controls?
N

N

Y
5780

Y

N

Y

Y

24984

Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
The number of observations differs from that in other results because of missing values for the dependent variable.
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Table 5
Market Size and Lawyer Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Share
Any Specialized
Field

Share
Ex Ante
Business Field

Share
Ex Post
Business Field

Share
Individual
Field

ln(county employment)

0.137
(0.006)

0.042
(0.004)

0.037
(0.004)

0.031
(0.006)

C

0.328
(0.012)

0.094
(0.006)

0.048
(0.005)

0.150
(0.008)

ln(county employment)

0.136
(0.012)

0.029
(0.007)

0.027
(0.007)

0.047
(0.009)

sh(mfg)

-0.188
(0.182)
0.063
(0.478)
0.482
(0.445)
0.217
(0.294)
1.153
(0.825)
-0.059
(0.269)
-0.021
(0.029)
-0.0004
(0.0034)
-0.0003
(0.0004)
-0.0007
(0.0017)
-0.0011
(0.0045)
0.0066
(0.0072)
-0.0064
(0.0053)
-0.0030
(0.0052)
0.291
(0.160)

0.090
(0.079)
-0.461
(0.263)
-0.360
(0.247)
0.033
(0.172)
1.193
(0.545)
0.019
(0.142)
-0.022
(0.030)
-0.0004
(0.0017)
-0.0007
(0.0002)
0.0017
(0.0013)
0.0031
(0.0020)
0.0028
(0.0041)
-0.0033
(0.0033)
-0.0001
(0.0028)
0.023
(0.069)

-0.005
(0.065)
0.364
(0.193)
0.641
(0.195)
-0.114
(0.137)
0.318
(0.419)
0.257
(0.118)
-0.034
(0.030)
0.0040
(0.0023)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0008
(0.0006)
-0.0023
(0.0015)
0.0064
(0.0034)
-0.0013
(0.0026)
-0.0031
(0.0021)
-0.095
(0.061)

-0.053
(0.144)
0.325
(0.376)
0.075
(0.391)
0.520
(0.255)
-0.416
(0.698)
-0.062
(0.207)
-0.001
(0.025)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0004
(0.0003)
-0.0015
(0.0013)
0.0011
(0.0031)
-0.0046
(0.0051)
0.0009
(0.0043)
0.0002
(0.0035)
0.090
(0.135)

Dependent Variable

sh(trans/util)
sh(wholesale)
sh(retail)
sh(FIRE)
sh(services)
state capital
emp/estab -- construction
emp/estab -- mfg
emp/estab -- trans/util
emp/estab -- wholesale
emp/estab -- retail
emp/estab -- FIRE
emp/estab -- services
C

N=6032
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 6
Market Size and Lawyer Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Ex Ante Business Specialties
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

Share
Banking

Share
Corporate

Share
Environmental

Share
Governmental

Share
Patent

Share
Real Estate

Share
Tax

0.001
(0.003)

0.011
(0.003)

0.002
(0.001)

0.003
(0.002)

0.000
(0.001)

0.008
(0.004)

0.004
(0.001)

Share
Insurance

Share
Negligence-Def

0.022
(0.004)

0.005
(0.004)

Share
Criminal

Share
Domestic Rel.

Share
Negligence-Pla

Share
Probate

0.009
(0.003)

0.004
(0.004)

0.026
(0.005)

0.007
(0.004)

Ex Post Business Specialties
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

Individual Specialties
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

N=6032
All regressions contain segment shares, average employment size within segments, state capital as controls.
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 7
Market Size, Lawyer, and Law Firm Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Dependent Variable

Share
Any Specialty

Share
Ex Ante
Business Specialty

Share
Ex Post
Business Specialty

Share
Individual
Speciality

0.011
(0.003)

0.031
(0.008)

Market Size and Law Office Specialization Regressions (Beta2)

ln(county employment)

0.066
(0.011)

0.004
(0.003)

Market Size and Individual Specialization Regressions (Beta1)
ln(county employment)

Beta2/Beta1

0.136
(0.012)

0.029
(0.007)

0.027
(0.007)

0.047
(0.009)

0.49

0.14

0.41

0.66

Controls include share of employment in 7 major sectors, average establishment size within each of these
sectors, and a state capital dummy
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 8
Market Size and Law Firm Specialization
Small Market Subsample
Estimates of Beta2, by Field

Ex Ante Business Fields
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

Share
Banking

Share
Corporate

Share
Environmental

Share
Governmental

Share
Patent

Share
Real Estate

Share
Tax

-0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.000)

0.002
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

Share
Insurance

Share
Negligence-Def

0.008
(0.002)

0.004
(0.003)

Share
Criminal

Share
Domestic Rel.

Share
Negligence-Pla

Share
Probate

0.009
(0.003)

0.003
(0.003)

0.014
(0.004)

0.005
(0.003)

Ex Post Business Fields
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

Individual Fields
Dependent Variable
ln(county employment)

N=26131
All regressions contain segment shares, average employment size within segments, state capital as controls.
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 9
Market Size, Lawyer, and Law Firm Specialization
Alternative Specifications
Share
Any Specialty

Share
Ex Ante
Business Specialty

Share
Ex Post
Business Specialty

Share
Individual
Speciality

Beta2

0.066
(0.011)

0.004
(0.003)

0.011
(0.003)

0.031
(0.008)

Beta1

0.136
(0.012)

0.029
(0.007)

0.027
(0.007)

0.047
(0.009)

Beta2

0.039
(0.009)

0.000
(0.005)

0.012
(0.003)

0.019
(0.004)

Beta1

0.083
(0.011)

0.020
(0.006)

0.021
(0.004)

0.017
(0.006)

Dependent Variable

Small Market Subsample

Full Sample

Small Market Subsample, Includes "Number of Lawyers in the Office" Dummies

Beta2

0.080
(0.011)

0.006
(0.003)

0.013
(0.004)

0.039
(0.008)

Beta1

0.117
(0.012)

0.015
(0.006)

0.014
(0.006)

0.054
(0.009)

Beta1 is the coefficient on ln(county employment) in regressions where the dependent variable is the share of
individuals who are specialized.
Beta2 is the coefficient on ln(county employment) in regressions where the dependent variable is the share of
individuals who work in field-specialized firms.
Controls include share of employment in 7 major sectors, average establishment size within each of these
sectors, and a state capital dummy. In the bottom panel, we also include 11 dummy variables that capture whether law
office has 2-12 lawyers, plus a dummy for whether it has more than 12 lawyers.
Small market subsample includes law offices in non-MSAs and in single-county MSAs with less than 225,000 employment.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level, and are reported in parentheses.
Bold indicates statistically significantly different from zero, using a two-sided t-test of size 0.05.
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Table 10
Normalized Composition of Law Firms

Banking

Corporate

Governmental

Environmental

Tax

Real Estate

Patent

Insurance

Negligence-Defendant

Criminal

Domestic

Negligence-Plaintiff

Probate

Other

General Practice

By Field

Banking
Corporate
Government
Environmental
Tax
Real Estate
Patent
Insurance
Neg-Def
Criminal
Domestic
Neg-Pla
Probate
Other
Gen Prac

7.52
1.27
1.06
1.34
1.18
1.44
0.35
0.61
0.73
0.33
0.61
0.64
0.97
0.65
0.30

4.42
1.26
1.50
1.84
1.18
0.63
0.50
0.65
0.48
0.49
0.31
1.12
1.05
0.25

24.28
2.36
1.13
0.85
0.42
0.56
0.71
0.47
0.80
0.37
0.81
0.73
0.29

13.61
1.39
0.96
0.62
0.99
1.04
0.44
0.47
0.26
0.86
1.02
0.31

10.90
1.07
0.53
0.37
0.60
0.41
0.40
0.22
1.62
0.89
0.27

6.79
0.25
0.35
0.54
0.49
0.74
0.60
1.27
0.68
0.25

39.05
0.01
0.17
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.22
0.31
0.09

11.75
0.58
0.19
0.30
0.14
0.52
0.23
0.12

9.83
0.19
0.33
0.37
0.64
0.26
0.15

26.97
1.61
0.84
0.59
0.28
0.16

20.80
0.78
1.10
0.38
0.29

10.03
0.43
0.18
0.13

11.31
0.53
0.29

4.20
0.18

2.95

Diagonal
(colleagues only)

4.47

3.48

13.93

10.38

3.73

2.63

32.62

9.95

8.23

6.43

5.95

4.50

3.02

2.83

1.38

Bold indicates values greater than 1.00.
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Figure 1
Specialization and Organizational Trade-Offs
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Figure 2
Share of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Field Specialized Firms
Ex Ante Business Fields

share

share of lawyers in specialized fields
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market size
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Figure 3
Share of Lawyers in Specialized Fields, Field Specialized Firms
Ex Post Business Fields
share

share of lawyers in specialized fields

share of lawyers in field-specialized firms

market size
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Appendix 1
Survey Form
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Appendix 2
List of Single-County MSAs in Small Market Sample
Abilene, TX
Albuquerque, NM
Alexandria, LA
Altoona, PA
Anchorage, AK
Anderson, IN
Anderson, SC
Anniston, AL
Asheville, NC
Bakersfield, CA
Battle Creek, MI
Bellingham, WA
Benton Harbor, MI
Billings, MT
Bloomington, IN
Bloomington-Normal, IL
Boise City, ID
Bradenton, FL
Bremerton, WA
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX
Bryan-College Station, TX
Burlington, NC
Casper, WY
Cedar Rapids, IA
Champaign-Urbana-Rantoul, IL
Cheyenne, WY
Chico, CA
Colorado Springs, CO
Columbia, MO
Daytona Beach, FL
Decatur, IL
Dubuque, IA
El Paso, TX
Elmira, NY
Enid, OK
Erie, PA
Eugene-Springfield, OR
Fayetteville, NC
Fayetteville-Springdale, AR
Flint, MI
Florence, SC

Fort Collins-Loveland, CO
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL
Fort Walton Beach, FL
Fresno, CA
Gadsden, AL
Grand Forks, ND
Great Falls, MT
Greeley, CO
Green Bay, WI
Hagerstown, MD
Huntsville, AL
Iowa City, IA
Jackson, MI
Jackson, TN
Jacksonville, NC
Jamestown-Dunkurk, NY
Janesville-Beloit, WI
Kalamazoo, MI
Kankakee, IL
La Crosse, WI
Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN
Lake Charles, LA
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL
Lancaster, PA
Laredo, TX
Las Cruces, NM
Lawrence, KS
Lawton, OK
Lincoln, NE
Lubbock, TX
Madison, WI
Mansfield, OH
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX
Medford, OR
Melbourne-Titusville, FL
Merced, CA
Midland, TX
Modesto, CA
Monroe, LA
Muncie, IN
Muskegon, MI

Naples, FL
Ocala, FL
Odessa, TX
Olympia, WA
Owensboro, KY
Panama City, FL
Pascagoula, MS
Pine Bluff, AR
Poughkeepsie, NY
Provo-Orem, UT
Pueblo, CO
Rapid City, SD
Reading, PA
Redding, CA
Reno, NV
Rochester, MN
St Joseph, MO
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA
San Angelo, TX
Sarasota, FL
Sharon, PA
Sheboygan, WI
Sioux Falls, SD
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN
Spokane, WA
State College, PA
Stockton, CA
Topeka, KS
Tucson, AZ
Tuscaloosa, AL
Tyler, TX
Victoria, TX
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA
Waco, TX
Wausau, WI
W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL
Wichita Falls, TX
Williamsport, PA
Wilmington, NC
Yakima, WA
Yuma, AZ

Note: The small market sample also includes all law offices located in non-MSAs.
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